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THE VIRTUES OF GOD AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 
Linda Zagzebski 
In this paper I give a theological foundation to a radical type of virtue ethics I 
call motivation-based. In motivation-based virtue theory all moral concepts are 
derivative from the concept of a good motive, the most basic component of a 
virtue, where what I mean by a motive is an emotion that initiates and directs 
action towards an end. Here I give a foundation to motivation-based virtue the-
ory by making the motivations of one person in particular the ultimate founda-
tion of al\ moral value, and that person is God. The theory is structurally paral-
lel to Divine Command Theory, but has a number of advantages over DC theo-
ry without the well-known problems. In particular, DM theory does not face a 
dilemma parallel to the famous Euthyphro problem, nor does it have any diffi-
culty answering the question whether God could make cruelty morally right. 
Unlike DC theory, it explains the importance of Christology in Christian ethics, 
and it has the advantage of providing a unitary account of all evaluative prop-
erties, divine and human. I call the theory Divine Motivation Theory. 
"Nothing will be called good except in so far as it has a certain 
likeness of the divine goodness." sec I. 40. 326. 
1. The foundations of virtue ethics 
A moral theory is an abstract structure that aims to simplify, system-
atize, and justify our moral practices and beliefs. The shape of the struc-
ture itself is typically either foundationalist or coherentist,. although 
well-known problems with both of these structures within epistemology 
may lead some ethicists to seek an alternative. A more radical approach 
is to give up the very idea of a moral theory, and virtue ethicists have 
been among the most prominent of the anti-theorists.' Contemporary 
virtue ethics, then, is often portrayed as not only an alternative to act-
based theories, but as an alternative to theorv itself. 
Virtue ethicists are particularly skeptical ~about foundationalist moral 
theory. Aretaic theories deriving from Aristotle or Aquinas make the 
foundational moral concept eudaimonia, or human flourishing, where 
eudaimonia is derivative from or dependent upon the allegedly non-
moral concept of human nature.2 But many contemporary ethicists have 
despaired of ever giving a clear and plausible account of eudaimonia, 
much less one that has universal applicability, and the concept of nature 
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has been attacked throughout the modern era on the grounds that it 
depends upon an outdated biology. Nonetheless, the concept of human 
nature has survived, if somewhat bruised,' and even eudaimonia has sur-
vived, although typically without the pretense of being foundational in 
the sense I mean here. 4 So skepticism about the ability of virtue ethics to 
even get started has kept many a contemporary philosopher away from 
it. And virtue theorists themselves are prone to this skepticism. So when 
virtue ethics entered a renaissance in the last two decades, it did so with-
out most of the theoretical trappings of modern theories. 
I am convinced that if virtue ethics is ever to be the equal rival of 
deontological and consequentialist ethics, it should have a form that is 
purely theoretical, one that addresses such basic issues as whether moral 
properties are grounded in non-moral properties, whether moral judg-
ments have a truth value, where morality gets its authority, how the 
moral properties of persons, acts, and states of affairs are related to each 
other, and many others.s I would not deny that it is desirable to have 
forms of virtue ethics that ignore these theoretical issues, and we proba-
bly cannot do both at the same time. But I believe that the human need 
to theorize is a powerful one. We want to understand the moral world 
as well as the natural world and, indeed, to understand the relation 
between the two. For Christians there is also the need to understand the 
relation between the moral world and the supernatural world. The 
reliance of the moral world on God puts constraints on the way we 
answer the deep questions just mentioned, although, as far as I can tell, 
belief in the Christian God puts no special constraint on whether the the-
ory is de ontological, consequentialist, aretaic, or some alternative, nor 
on whether the structure of the theory is foundationalist, coherentist, or 
some alternative. But Christian philosophers have traditionally agreed 
that in some sense God is the foundation of moral value, and that makes 
the search for a foundationalist structure a natural one even though I see 
no reason to think that a belief in moral foundationalism is a require-
ment of Christianity. 
In this paper I want to exhibit one way to structure a virtue ethics 
with a theological foundation; in fact, the theological foundation is an 
extension of virtue theory to God himself. It is, then, a divine virtue the-
ory. In other work I have outlined a strong form of virtue ethics I call 
motivation-based." This theory makes all moral concepts derivative from 
the concept of a good motive, the most basic component of a virtue, 
where what I mean by a motive is an emotion that initiates and directs 
action towards an end. In outlining that theory I left unanswered the 
important question of what makes a motive a good one. In this paper I 
will give motivation-based virtue theory a theological foundation by 
making the motivations of one person in particular the ultimate founda-
tion of all moral value, and that person is God. I call the theory Divine 
Motivation Theory. 
Divine Motivation Theory has the following structure: The motiva-
tional states of God are ontologically and explanatorily the basis for all 
moral properties. God's motives are perfectly good and human motives 
are good in so far as they are similar to the divine motives as those 
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motives would be expressed in finite and embodied beings. Like motiva-
tion-based virtue theory, all moral properties, including the moral prop-
erties of persons, acts and states of affairs, are grounded in their relation 
to good motives, but they are more specifically grounded in their rela-
tion to the motives of a perfect being whose nature is the metaphysical 
foundation of all value. The theory is structurally parallel to Divine 
Command Theory, but it has many advantages over that theory while 
avoiding the disadvantages. 
II. The theory without the foundation: Motivation-based virtue theory 
In any foundationalist moral theory there is something that is good in 
the most basic way. If the goodness of something is really foundational, 
it cannot be justified or explained by the goodness of something else, 
and it is usually claimed that it needs no justification or explanation. 
Theorists almost always hedge this claim, however, and try to think of 
some way of justifying what the theory says cannot be justified, as Mill 
does in attempting to justify the goodness of pleasure in chap. 4 of 
Utilitarianism. Even Aristotle (who may not be intending to present a 
foundationalist structure anyway), appeals to common belief in justify-
ing his claim that eudaimonia is the ultimate good in Book I of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Kant uses a transcendental argument to defend the 
primacy of the Categorical Imperative. And Sidgwick reaches his 
allegedly self-evident moral principles from reflection upon moral intu-
ition in Methods of Ethics. 
What I mean by a pure virtue theory is one in which the concept of a 
good human trait (a virtue) is logically prior to the concept of a right act, 
and in the strongest form, the concept of a virtue is also prior to the con-
cept of a good state of affairs. The theory I will outline here is an 
instance of the strongest form of pure virtue theory, making all evalua-
tive concepts logically dependent upon the concept of a virtue- more 
specifically, on the most basic component of a virtue, a motivation. In 
this section I will outline the structure of a motivation-based virtue theo-
ry only briefly since my principal interest in this paper is to show how a 
theological foundation can be given for this theory that should be attrac-
tive to the Christian philosopher. That task will be left for sections Ill-V. 
I propose that moral properties presuppose the existence of persons. 
They are either properties of persons or their acts, or they are derivative 
from the properties of persons, e.g., the properties of personal cre-
ations- social institutions, practices, laws, etc? It is common in ethics to 
think of the will as the center of the moral self, and for this reason, moral 
properties are often thought to be most fundamentally properties of the 
will. The primacy of the will as the bearer of moral value emerged grad-
ually throughout the medieval period, reaching its clearest expression 
during that period in the work of Duns Scotus, and, of course, reaching 
its zenith in the modern period in Kant's famous claim that there is 
nothing good without qualification but a good will. My proposal is to 
retain the focus of moral evaluation on the person, but to shift it away 
from the will, both when we are talking about God and when we are 
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talking about human beings, and to focus instead on emotion. 
I suggest that moral properties in the primary sense attach to emo-
tions. Emotions are good or bad in themselves; they do not derive their 
goodness or badness from their relation to anything else that is good or 
bad. In particular, they are not good or bad in virtue of their relationship 
to the states of affairs which are their intentional objects or the states of 
affairs which produce them. For example, it is bad to take delight in the 
misfortune of others or to enjoy the sight of animals in pain, even when 
these emotions never motivate the agent to act on them. And the bad-
ness of these emotions is not derivative from the badness of the pain of 
animals or the misfortune of others. I will not give an account of the 
state of emotion here, but it suffices for the purposes of this paper to say 
that an emotion has a cognitive component as well as a feeling compo-
nent. The cognitive component mayor may not be as fully formed as a 
belief or a judgment, although it always involves taking or supposing or 
imagining some portion of the world to be a certain way8- e.g., threat-
ening, exciting, boring, pitiful, contemptible, etc. The feeling component 
i.1Ccompanies seeing something as threatening, exciting, contemptible. 
The agent feels threatened by something seen as threatening, feels excit-
ed by something seen as exciting, feels contemptuous of something seen 
as contemptible, and so on. 
The cognitive aspect of emotion suggests that emotions have inten-
tional objects, which is to say, a person is afraid of something, is angry at 
someone, is excited about something, loves someone, and so on, and some 
writers have taken the intentionality of emotion to be a characteristic 
distinguishing emotions from similar psychic states such as moods or 
pure feelings. I am inclined to accept this position, although it is not crit-
ical for the thesis of this paper. 
A motive is an emotion that initiates, sustains, and directs action 
towards an end. Not all motives are emotions since some motives are 
almost purely physiological, such as the motives of hunger, thirst, or 
fatigue, and for this reason these states are sometimes called "drives". 
But the motives that have foundational ethical significance are emotions. 
It is also possible that not all emotions are motivating since some emo-
tions may be purely passive, which is why emotions were formerly 
called "passions". Examples of passive emotions might include joy, sad-
ness, tranquillity, and the enjoyment of beauty. But even these emotions 
probably can motivate in certain circumstances. It is usual to call an 
emotion a motive only when it actually operates to motivate on a partic-
ular occasion. But when an emotion that sometimes motivates does not 
operate to motivate at a particular time, it retains its motivational poten-
tial. So not all motives are emotions, but the morally significant ones are 
emotions, and most, if not all, emotions are or can be motives. That is, 
they have potential motivational force. 9 
Motives tend to be persistent and become dispositions, at which point 
they become components of enduring traits of character- virtues or 
vices. Each virtue has a motivational component which is the disposition 
to have an action-guiding emotion characteristic of the particular virtue. 
The virtuous person is disposed to perform acts motivated by such an 
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emotion. So a person with the virtue of benevolence is disposed to act in 
ways motivated by the emotion of benevolence; a person with the virtue 
of courage is disposed to act in ways motivated by the distinctive emo-
tion underlying the behavior of those who face danger when they judge 
it to be necessary to obtain a greater good; a person with the virtue of 
justice is disposed to act in ways expressing an attitude of equal respect 
for the humanity of others, and so on.HI 
A virtue also has a success component which is a component of relia-
bility in reaching the end of the motivational component of the virtue. 
Some virtuous motives aim at producing a state of affairs of a certain 
kind. The state of affairs may either be internal to the agent or external 
to the agent. Other virtuous motives aim to express the emotion of the 
agent. Temperance is an example of a virtue whose motivational compo-
nent aims at producing a state within the agent, whereas fairness is a 
virtue whose motivational component aims at producing a state of 
affairs external to the agent. Empathy and gratitude are examples of 
virtues whose motivational components aim at expressing the agent's 
emotional state. Successfully achieving the end of a virtuous motive, 
then, sometimes amounts to bringing about a state of affairs completely 
distinct from the motivating emotion, and sometimes success is achieved 
by merely expressing the emotion itself. 
Some human motivations are good and others are bad. Good human 
motivations are components of virtues; bad human motivations are com-
ponents of vices. If a human motive is a good one, reliable success in 
achieving its end is also a good thing. The goodness of the virtuous end 
is derivative from the goodness of the motive, not the other way around. 
The combination of a good human motivation with reliable success in 
reaching its end is a good human trait- a virtue. A vice is the combina-
tion of a bad human motivation with reliable success in reaching the end 
of the bad motivation. 
The evaluative properties of acts are derivative from the evaluative 
properties of persons. Roughly, a right (permissible) act is an act a virtu-
ous person might do. That is, it is not the case that she would not do it.lI 
A wrong act is an act a virtuous person characteristically would not do. 
Vicious persons characteristically perform wrong acts, but so do persons 
who are neither vicious nor virtuous, and virtuous persons also may 
perform wrong acts, but uncharacteristically. A moral duty is an act a 
virtuous person characteristically would do. A virtuous act is one that 
expresses the motivational component of the virtue. For example, a com-
passionate act is one that expresses the motivation of compassion. It is 
an act in which the agent is motivated by compassion and acts with the 
intention of reaching the motivational end of compassion, the alleviation 
of the suffering of someone else. In the case of certain virtues, most espe-
cially justice, acts expressing the virtue are all moral duties. In the case 
of other virtues (e.g., compassion, kindness, mercy) many acts express 
the virtue but are not moral dutiesY 
The moral properties of states of affairs can also be defined in terms of 
good and bad motivations. Roughly, a good state of affairs is one that is the 
end of a good motive. A bad state of affairs is one that is the end of a bad 
THE VIRTUES OF GOD AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 543 
motive.13 Goodness and badness of motives are more fundamental than 
goodness and badness of states of affairs. This is a generalization of the point 
that all moral value derives from a personal God. (Of course, non-moral 
value does also, but the subject of this paper is moral value). My conjecture is 
that the nature of moral value is such that it must derive from persons and 
more particularly, from the motivational states of persons. This view on the 
relation between the value of a motive and the value of the state of affairs at 
which it aims reverses the more usual view that the motive to bring about a 
bad state of affairs such as pain in others is bad because pain is a bad thing. 
Instead, my suggestion is that pain is a bad thing in the morally relevant 
sense because of the badness of the motive to bring it about. That motive is 
an emotional state that is bad in a sense that does not derive from the bad-
ness of anything other than other motives (the motives of God). 
In motivation-based virtue theory there is a logical connection 
between the two senses of good- the admirable and the desirable, with 
the latter deriving from the former. Similarly, there is a logical connec-
tion between two senses of bad- the despicable and the undesirable. 11 
Intuitively the distinction between the two senses of good and bad can 
be important since we think there is a fundamental difference between 
the sense in which injustice is bad and the sense in which pain is bad, or 
the sense in which compassion is good and the sense in which tranquilli-
ty is good. And this difference is not simply the difference between 
moral and non-moral good and bad because those things that are good 
or bad in the sense of desirable/undesirable can have moral significance. 
If so, it would be very peculiar if the two senses of good and bad just 
distinguished were unconnected, and I am proposing that they are not. 
The good in the most fundamental sense of good is the admirable, and 
the bad in the most fundamental sense of bad is the despicable. The 
good in the sense of desirable is defined in terms of what is desired by 
admirable people, while the bad in the sense of undesirable is what 
admirable people desire to prevent or to eliminate.]; 
In motivation-based virtue theory motives are good or bad in the 
most fundamental sense of good or bad. But what makes a motive good? 
One way we might answer this question is to borrow a suggestion from 
Plato in the Republic, where Socrates states that a good (just) person is 
one whose soul is in harmony. The idea would be that motives (emo-
tions) are good when they integrate into a harmonious whole. This sug-
gestion is worth pursuing, but the answer I want to give here is a theo-
logical one. Moral value is constituted by a harmony with the divine, not 
just a harmony within the soul. Human motives are good in so far as 
they are like God's motives. Since motives are emotions, this means that 
God must have emotions, a controversial position in Christian theology, 
although I will argue that the theory can stand without the claim that 
the states in God which are the counterparts of human emotions are also 
emotions. In any case, human virtues are modeled on the virtues of God. 
In humans virtues are finite representations of the traits of a perfect 
God. Since the gap between God and ourselves is infinite, it may seem to 
be hopelessly impractical, even if theologically and metaphysically 
desirable, to model our moral traits on God in this way. But we have 
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Christ incarnate as our archetype. What I will propose in what follows is 
a way to give the traditional Christian idea of ethics as the imitation of 
Christ a theoretical structure. 
III. The virtues of God 
There are many accounts of virtue in the history of ethics, but all 
accounts agree that virtues are excellences; they are good personal traits. 
If we assume that the goodness of God is the metaphysical ground of all 
value, it is natural to ask whether God has virtues. It may seem that the 
answer is no, and in good Thomistic fashion I will start with the objec-
tions to the thesis before proceeding to argue that God does have virtues, 
and that the divine virtues include both a motivational component and a 
success component as described in section II. More importantly, the 
divine virtues are not simply pale imitations of the more robust and rich-
ly nuanced traits of embodied and encultured beings. The relationship 
between divine and human virtues is, in fact, the reverse: Human virtues 
are pale imitations of the divine virtues. Admittedly we cannot really 
grasp perfection and we tend to find imperfection more interesting, per-
haps because it admits of more variety than perfection and we find that 
thinking about perfection is too demanding a task since our experience is 
limited to the imperfect. Nonetheless, I believe that God is the only being 
who is virtuous in a pure and unqualified sense. As Aquinas says, all 
moral properties are attributed primarily to God and only analogously to 
humans. I believe that this includes the virtues and the primary compo-
nent of virtue, a motivation. 
In giving the following objections I will work with the high meta-
physical view of God's nature that was developed in the medieval peri-
od and has its most subtle and penetrating expression in the thought of 
Aquinas. I will, however, propose a modification of that view since I 
submit that God has emotions. 
Objection 1: God cannot have a virtue if a virtue includes a motiva-
tional component and a motive is an emotional state since God has no 
emotions. God cannot have emotions since (i) emotions involve the 
sense appetite and require a body, but God has no body or sensory 
appetite, and (ii) emotions are passions, ways of being acted upon, and 
that implies imperfection, but God is perfect and, hence, impassible. 
Objection 2: Virtues are habits that involve overcoming contrary 
temptations and take time to develop, so they only make sense when 
attributed to imperfect beings who undergo change. But God does not 
develop his traits and has no contrary temptations; he is perfect and 
unchangeable. 
Objection 3: Virtues are traditionally explained teleologically by refer-
ence to the natural end of a thing of a certain kind, an end that is not 
already actualized. This means that virtue presupposes potency. The 
virtues are goods for a thing as a member of a natural kind. But God is 
not lacking anything and has no potency, nor does God belong to a nat-
ural kind. Furthermore, it's hard to see how anything could be good for 
God. 
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Objection 4: Virtues in their richer and more interesting forms are 
socially and culturally conditioned. Honesty in parts of Asia is very dif-
ferent from honesty in the US. even when we consider only the later 
twentieth century. Cultural differences are even greater when we look at 
other historical periods. The practical usefulness of the concept of virtue 
depends upon our learning these richer, culture-dependent concepts. 
But it is hard to see how the virtues of God could serve such a practical 
purpose, even assuming that God does have virtues. We learn virtues by 
learning social practices, not by learning theology. 
Virtues are the good traits of moral agents. The more perfect the 
moral agent, the more perfect the virtues. God is both a moral agent and 
a perfect being. Therefore, God has perfectly good moral traits- perfect 
virtues. Like all moral agents, God has motives, where motives are both 
explanations of and justifications for an agent's acts. In humans motives 
become dispositions, but if God has no dispositions, then God's motives 
are always in act, and God is always acting upon them. Since God is the 
perfect agent, God's motives are the perfect motives. God's love is the 
perfect motive of love; God's compassion is the perfect motive of com-
passion; God's mercy is the perfect motive of mercy, and so on. Since 
compassion, love, mercy, etc. are emotions, God's compassion, love, 
mercy, etc. are perfect emotions. I am not suggesting that it necessarily 
follows from the fact that God acts from compassion, and that the state 
of compassion in humans is an emotion, that God has emotions. I do 
think that having emotions is part of what makes a being a moral agent. 
But the minimum I want to insist upon in this paper is that God's 
virtues, like our virtues, include a component of motivation- a state 
that is act-directing, as well as reliable success in bringing about the aim 
of the motive. God's motives are perfect, and his success is perfect as 
well. God is, therefore, not just reliable, he is perfectly reliable. A divine 
virtue, then, is the combination of a perfect motive with perfect success 
in bringing about the end of the motive.'6 
Reply to objection 1: An emotion is a state of consciousness of a certain 
kind. I have suggested that that state includes a cognitive aspect where-
by the emotion's intentional object is understood or construed to be a 
certain way. But an emotion is also an affective state; it has a certain 
"feel". No~ the fact that God has no body precludes God from having 
emotions only if the possession of a body is a necessary condition for the 
states of consciousness in question, and that, of course, is denied by the 
Cartesian view on the relation between mind and body. Furthermore, 
even if Aquinas is right that sensory experience necessarily requires a 
body, it is not obvious that emotions necessarily have a sensory compo-
nent if we mean by "sensory" a state that is of the same kind as states of 
consciousness that arise from the five senses or that are localized, such 
as the sensation of pain. But suppose we grant the objection. Suppose 
we agree with Aquinas that God has no passions (passiones) since these 
belong to the sensory appetite and the sensory appetite requires a body. 
Aquinas agrees that God does have affectiones since the latter admits of 
two kinds, sensory and intellective. God has intellective appetites which 
belong to the will. In this category are included states that we call emo-
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tions, states such as love and joy. We see, then, that there are two words 
that refer to affective states in Aquinas, "passiones" and "affectioncs." 
"Passiones" may be translated "passion" or "emotion," whereas Norman 
Kretzmann suggests "attitudes" as the translation for "affectioncs."17 As 
Kretzmann translates Aquinas, then, God has certain "attitudes" of love 
and joy, but these states are not emotions since Kretzmann maintains 
that Aquinas maintains that God has no emotions. But a case could be 
made for translating "affectiones" as "emotions" if it is true that even in 
us, states of emotion are not necessarily sensory. If some of our emotions 
are, or could be, intellective affectiones this would mean that the sensory 
aspect of an emotion is not essential to a state's being one of emotion. If 
so, a state could not be denied the categorization of an emotion on the 
grounds that it is not a sensory state. Thus, even if God has no sensory 
states it would not follow that he has no emotions. 
Objection 1 gives a second reason for thinking that God cannot have 
emotions and that is that emotions are passions, ways of being acted 
upon, and thereby imply lack of perfection. r will not here address the 
issue of whether emotions are necessarily passive, but I do want to raise 
the question of whether emotion is an intrinsically defective state, a state 
that only makes sense when attributed to defective beings. I do not see 
that there is anything about emotion per se that implies imperfection, 
although there is no doubt that there are particular emotions that do 
have such an implication- e.g., fear, hope, jealousy, envy, hatred, bitter-
ness. I hesitate to say that sadness implies a defect since sadness need 
not require any lack in the agent who has the emotion since it is a 
response to defects outside of the agent. The issue of whether the agent 
who has a certain emotion is defective does not correspond to the dis-
tinction that is sometimes made between positive and negative emo-
tions. Some negative emotions such as sadness may imply no defect, 
whereas some positive emotions such as hope probably do imply a 
defect. This means that while God does have emotions, he does not have 
the range of emotions that human beings have. 
r have already said that it is not necessary to accept that Cod has emo-
tions for the argument of this paper in spite of what r have said in this 
reply. Even if God does not have emotions, God nonetheless has states 
that are the counterparts of the states which in us are emotions. God has 
emotions in at least the same sense that God has beliefs. God's emotions 
may not be just like ours, but God's cognitive states are not just like ours 
either. What is of particular importance for Divine Motivation Theory is 
not so much that God's emotions are similar to ours in the way they feel, 
but that the divine states which are the counterparts of human emotions 
are motivations. That much should not be controversial. Since God is a 
moral agent, God acts from motives, and among those motives are com-
passion, forgiveness, and love. 
Reply to objection 2: As Norman Kretzmann has pointed out to me, 
while Aquinas says that virtue is a habit, "habitus" to Aquinas means 
fundamentally the same thing as "having." The dispositional aspect of a 
habitus is important in his account of human virtues and vices because of 
our temporality and imperfection, but the idea of a disposition or habit 
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is not essential to a habitus as Aquinas means it and does not prevent 
God from having qualities that in us would be habits or dispositions. For 
example, knowledge is a habitus and most human knowledge is disposi-
tional. But the fact that God has no dispositions does not prevent God 
from having knowledge, nor does it prevent God's knowledge from 
being a habitus since God's knowledge is the eternal having of all truths. 
Similarly, even though a virtue such as compassion is a habitus which in 
us requires development over time culminating in a disposition distinc-
tive of the virtue of compassion, that does not prevent God from having 
compassion, nor does it prevent compassion in God from being a habi-
tus. God eternally has the emotion of compassion, not just as a disposi-
tion, but as an eternal motive-in-act. 
Reply to objection 3: If a natural kind is a species, then God is not a nat-
ural kind, although God does have a nature and God is a certain kind of 
thing, namely, Absolutely Perfect Being, or Necessarily Existent Being. 
Each of the traditional arguments for the existence of God identifies a 
kind of thing that must be God, a kind of thing which, it must be argued, 
can have only one member. The divine virtues express the perfections of 
the kind God. There is no potency in God, but we can see that there is 
nothing inconsistent in the claim that a being with no potency has 
virtues since if, per impossibile, a human being reached full actualization 
of her potential with respect to some virtue, say, compassion, we certain-
ly would not on that account deny that she is compassionate. The way in 
which a virtue is acquired is not essential to the virtue itself, although it 
may be essential to beings with a human nature to acquire virtue in a 
certain way. This means that there is nothing good for God if that means 
an extrinsic good that God needs for actualization, but there is still a 
sense in which God's virtues are good for him since even in the human 
case we do not cease claiming that what is good for us is good for us 
once it is attained. It is good for a human to have knowledge even when 
the knowledge is possessed; it is good for a knife to be sharp even when 
it is sharp. And it is good for God to be perfectly just, merciful, etc. 1M 
Reply to objection 4: This is not an objection to the claim that God has 
virtues, nor even to the theoretical usefulness of understanding human 
moral properties in terms of God's virtues, but to the practical relevance 
of the claim for moral education and training. An answer to this objec-
tion would require a demonstration of the way the idea of a virtuous 
God can be integrated into the biblical doctrine of imitatio Dei. That issue 
will be addressed in the next section. 
IV. Divine Motivation Theory 
Motivation-based virtue theory is a very general form of pure virtue 
ethics in which motivational states are the most basic bearers of moral 
value and the moral properties of persons, acts, and states of affairs are 
defined in terms of the goodness and badness of motives. I outlined the 
way to give these definitions in section II. Divine Motivation Theory 
makes the motives of one being in particular the primary bearer of 
moral value, and that is God. The complete theory can still make the 
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goodness of human motives the primary bearer of moral value in a uni-
verse of human persons, human acts, and the states of affai~rs encoun-
tered by human beings. But the goodness of human motives needs to be 
explained since we humans are quite clearly imperfect in our nature and 
the goodness of our motives is never pure. 
God has such virtues as justice, benevolence, mercy, forgiveness, 
kindness, love, compassion, loyalty, generosity, trustworthiness, integri-
ty, and wisdom. God does not have courage, temperance, chastity, piety, 
nor perhaps humility, nor does he have faith or hope. Each of the virtues 
in the latter group involve handling emotions that are distinctive of lim-
ited and embodied creatures like ourselves. Sexual feelings make no 
sense when applied to a disembodied being, and since God does not 
have to deal with fear, the awareness of inferiority to a superior being, 
the sense of powerlessness, nor the need for faith in God, which is to 
say, himself, it does not make sense to say that God has the virtues in 
this category. This means that God's virtues correspond to only some of 
the traits we consider human virtues. Of course, it does not follow that 
God's virtues are limited to these traits. It would be presumptuous of us 
to think that all divine virtues are perfections of human traits. If there 
are angels, God's virtues no doubt include perfections of angelic virtues, 
and if there are any other moral creatures in existence, God's virtues 
would include the perfections of the virtues of those beings as well. This 
position is expressed by Aquinas as follows: 
For just as God's being is universally perfect, in some way or other 
containing within itself the perfection of all beings, so also must his 
goodness in some way or other contain within itself the goodness 
of all things. Now a virtue is a goodness belonging to a virtuous 
person, for "it is in accordance with it that one is called good, and 
what one does is called good" [NE 1106a22-4]. Therefore, in its own 
way the divine goodness must contain all virtues. (SCG I. 92.768).19 
But how are we to understand what it means for God to "contain" all 
the virtues, even those I have already agreed God does not have-
virtues like chastity, humility, and courage? And how can the virtues 
God does have give us any practical guidance in the moral life? The 
answer, I suggest, is that we humans ought to think of Divine 
Motivation Theory in conjunction with the doctrines of the Trinity and 
the Incarnation. The arguments in natural theology about the nature of 
God do not pertain to Christ, the Incarnate Son of God. Christ did have 
the virtues of chastity, humility, and courage, as well as all the other 
virtues humans ought to develop, so the virtues of Christ are "con-
tained" in the nature of God in the way that Christ is contained in God 
according to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Tl-ds means 
that these important Christian doctrines have a special place in the meta-
physics of Christian morals. The Incarnation also helps us to resolve the 
practical problem of how we learn to be moral since we are called to 
develop the virtues by the imitation of Christ. 
The idea that humans should become as much like God as is humanly 
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possible is the basis of the primary ethical doctrine of the Hebrew Bible, that 
of imitatio Dei.20 "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy" (Lev. 
19:2) To become like God is to follow God's commands: "The Lord will 
establish you for a holy people unto Himself, as He has sworn unto you; if 
you shall keep the commandments of the Lord your God, and walk in His 
ways." (Deut 28: 9). The focus of Christian ethics, in contrast, is less on fol-
lowing divine commands than on imitating the virtues of Christ, and the 
focus of the New Testament is primarily on the motivational component of 
these virtues. We see Jesus in a variety of human circumstances that produce 
recognizable human emotions, including temptation, weariness, anxiety, 
sadness, and anger. Jesus makes very few commands, but when he does, his 
injunctions generally call us to have motivations (emotion-dispositions) 
which I claim are the basic components of virtues, as in the Beatitudes and 
the two great commandments of love. The New Testament does not typical-
ly call us to will, but to be motivated in a virtuous way, so St. Paul says, 
"Owe no one anything but to love one another" (Romans 13:8). The Golden 
Rule appeals to a motive, not to a volition. We imagine how we would want 
to be treated and imaginatively project our own wants onto others. This 
leads us to have an emotional response to other persons that motivates our 
treatment of them. Our motive for loving and forgiving is not that we are to 
follow God's commands, but that God himself loves and forgives. And we 
see that there is no limit on the forgiveness of injuries because it corresponds 
to God's forgiveness of us, not because it will win over the offender or 
because God wills it (Matt18:21ff). The same point applies to the call "Be per-
fect even as your heavenly father is perfect." (Matt 5:48). 
Many Christian ethicists have worked on basing ethics on the imita-
tion of Christ. Much of this work uses the narrative approach to ethics, 
and my purpose is not to duplicate it, but to show how this approach 
can be combined with the theoretical structure I have outlined here to 
produce a theory that is both theoretically powerful and practically use-
ful. In addition to narrative ethics, many Christian ethicists have pro-
duced careful and subtle elucidations of the individual virtues based on 
Scripture and the Christian tradition of veneration of the saints. Here 
also I neither intend nor am able to duplicate this work which has, in 
any case, been done very well by others, but to show how the philoso-
pher's theoretical urge can be formulated in a way that combines natu-
rally with these other approaches to Christian ethics. 
V. Advantages of DM theory over DC theory 
Divine Motivation Theory is structurally parallel to Divine Command 
Theory in that DM theory makes moral properties derivative from God's 
motives, whereas DC theory makes moral properties derivative from 
God's will. In this section I will briefly compare the two theories to 
show how DM theory avoids the well-known problems of DC theory 
and has some decided advantages. 
Divine Command theory makes the divine will the source of moral 
value. Roughly, good stat~s of affairs are what God wills to exist; bad 
states of affairs are what God wills not to exist. The focus of the theory, 
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however, is generally on the rightness and wrongness of human acts. An 
act is morally required (a duty) just in case God commands us to do it; 
an act is morally wrong just in case God forbids us to do it. Since a 
divine command is the expression of God's will with respect to human 
and other creaturely acts, the divine will is the fundamental source of 
the moral properties of acts as well as of states of affairs. 
The nature of the relation between God's commands and moral 
requirements is an important issue for DC theorists. To say that "x is 
morally required" just means "x is commanded by God" is too strong 
since that has the consequence that to say !Ix is right because God com-
mands it" is a mere tautology; it is just to say /Ix is commanded by God 
because x is commanded by God." On the other hand, to say that God's 
commands and moral requirements are extensionally equivalent is too 
weak. That is compatible with the lack of any metaphysical connection 
whatever between the existence of moral properties and God's will. The 
DC theory, then, aims at something in between identity of meaning and 
mere extensional equivalence. It should turn out that God's will makes 
what's good to be good and what's right to be right. States of affairs are 
good/bad and acts are right/wrong because of the will of God. God's 
will is the metaphysical ground of all moral properties. This is also the 
sense in which God's motives ground moral value in DM theory. 
An important objection to Divine Command theory goes back to Plato's 
Euthyphro where Socrates asks, "Is what is holy holy because the gods 
approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" (10a). As applied to DC 
theory this question produces a famous dilemma: If God wills the good 
because it is good, then goodness is independent of God's will and the latter 
does not explain the former. On the other hand, if something is good because 
God wills it, then it looks as if the divine will is arbitrary. God is not con-
strained by any moral reason from willing anything whatever, and it is hard 
to see how any non-moral reason could be the right sort of reason to deter-
mine God's choice of what to make good or bad. The apparent consequence 
is that good/bad and right/wrong are determined by an arbitrary divine 
will; God could have commanded cruelty or hatred, and if he had done so, 
cruel and hateful acts would have been right, even duties. This is not only an 
unacceptable consequence for our sense of the essentiality of the moral prop-
erties of acts of certain kinds, but it also makes it hard to see how it can be 
true that God himself is good in any important, substantive sense of good. 
Robert Adams has attempted to address this problem by modifying 
DC theory to say that the property of rightness is the property of being 
commanded by a loving God. This permits Adams to allow that God 
could command cruelty for its own sake, but if God did so he would not 
love us, says Adams, and if that were the case, he argues, morality 
would break down. Morality is dependent upon divine commands, but 
they are dependent upon the commands of a deity with a certain nature. 
If God's nature were not loving, morality would fall aparFI 
But even if Adams's proposal succeeds at answering the objection it is 
designed to address, it seems to me that it is unsatisfactory because it is ad 
hoc. There is no intrinsic connection between a command and the property of 
being loving, so to tie morality to the commands of a loving God is to tie it to 
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two distinct properties of God. In OM theory, however, there is no need to 
solve the problem of whether God could make it right that we brutalize the 
innocent by making any such modification to the theory since being loving is 
one of God's essential motives. The right thing for humans to do is to act on 
motives that imitate the divine motives. Brutalizing the innocent is not an act 
that expresses a motive that imitates the divine motives. Hence, it is impossi-
ble for brutalizing the innocent to be right as long as (i) it is impossible for 
such an act to be an expression of a motive that is like the motives of God, 
and (ii) it is impossible for God to have different motives. (ii) follows from 
the highly plausible assumption that God's motives are part of his nature. 
DC theory also can argue that God's will is part of his nature, and 
Stump and Kretzmann have used the Thomistic doctrine of divine sim-
plicity, which has the consequence that God's will is identical with his 
nature, to solve both the arbitrariness problem and the problem that God 
could command something like cruelty.22 This solution is not ad hoc, but it 
requires argument to make the needed connection between the divine will 
and the divine nature. That is because a will is logically separable from its 
possessor in a way that motives are not. In fact, the feature of a will that 
led to the theory of the existence of a will in the first place, namely, its 
freedom, is the very feature that seems to have that consequence. In con-
trast, God's love, mercy, justice, compassion, etc., make God what he is. 
There is no need to overcome by argument a prior expectation that God's 
motives are dissociated from his nature as in the case of God's commands. 
The arbitariness problem mayor may not be answerable in a DC theory, 
but the problem does not even arise in OM theory. That is because a will 
needs a reason, but a motive is a reason. The will, according to Aquinas, 
always chooses "under the aspect of good," which means that reasons are 
not inherent in the will itself. In contrast, motives provide not only the impe-
tus to action, but the reason for the action. If we know that God acts from a 
motive of love there is no need to look for a further reason for the act. On the 
other hand, a divine command requires a reason, and if the reason is or 
includes fundamental divine motivational states such as love, it follows that 
even DC theory needs to refer to God's motives to avoid the consequence 
that moral properties are arbitrary and God himself is not good. This move 
makes divine motives more basic than the divine will even in DC theory. 
Aside from DC's difficulty with these objections, Divine Motivation 
theory has an important theoretical advantage. OM theory gives us a uni-
tary theory of all evaluative properties, divine as well as human, whereas 
DC theory does not. DC theory is most naturally interpreted as an ethics 
of law, a divine deontological theory, wherein the content of the law is 
promulgated by divine commands. God's own goodness and the right-
ness of God's own acts, however, are not connected to divine commands. 
In contrast, OM theory makes the features of the divine nature in virtue of 
which God is morally good the foundation for the moral goodness of 
those same features in creatures. Both divine and human goodness are 
explained in terms of good motives, and the goodness of human motives 
is derived from the goodness of the divine motives. OM theory, then, is a 
virtue theory that applies to both divine and human moral properties. 
We have already seen another feature of OM theory that gives it an 
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advantage over DC theory, and that is that DM theory shows the impor-
tance of Christology for ethics, whereas DC theory does not. DC theory 
ignores the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, focusing on the 
will of the Creator-God as the source of moral value. It is, in effect, an 
Old Testament theory. The features of Christian ethics that derive from 
the life of Christ do not appear in the theory, at least not in any straight-
forward way. The fact that DM theory integrates these features into the 
theory makes it theologically preferable as well as easier to apply. 
Elsewhere I have argued that DM theory, like DC theory, has the 
resources to solve some important puzzles in natural theology: the para-
doxes of perfect goodness and the logical problem of evil.23 I will not 
review these arguments here, but if they work, they point to an advan-
tage that both DM and DC theory have over other theories. If DM theory 
also has the advantages over DC theory I have mentioned here, that sug-
gests that a strong case could be made for DM theory. I will undertake a 
full defense of the theory in a longer project,24 
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